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ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND PRODUCT DESIGN
IN PLATFORM MARKETS: MICROSOFT
AND INTEL
WILLIAM H. PAGE
SELDON J. CHILDERS*

The Antitrust Division's Microsoft case' and the Federal Trade Commission's Intel case 2 both rested on claims that antitrust intervention was necessary to preserve innovation in technological platforms at the heart of the
personal computer.' Yet those very platforms support markets that have long
been among the most innovative in the economy. Intel's market in particular
is the subject of Moore's Law, the most famous expression of the speed and
consistency of innovation in the world of high technology.4 The innovative* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law; and
Member of the Florida Bar, respectively. For helpful comments, we thank Annabelle Gawer,
Joseph Kattan, and the participants at the Antitrust and the Wider Economy conference at the
University of Michigan, October 2010.
' See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (D.C. Circuit 2001).
Because so many opinions in the Microsoft litigation have the same name, the customary numbering of opinions by Roman numeral for citation (e.g., Microsoft V) conveys no information.
Consequently, we adopt the citation strategy of WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE
MIcRosoFr CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 203-42 (2007),
which identifies the opinion by the court and year. The D.C. Circuit's pivotal 2001 opinion, for
example, will be cited as D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at _.
2 Complaint, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Intel Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf; Decision and Order, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Oct. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Intel Order], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101102inteldo.pdf. This order modifies, after the public
comment period, a proposed order published on August 4, 2010.
3 The role of antitrust in fostering (or not impeding) innovation has long preoccupied antitrust
scholars. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter v. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575 (2007); Sean P. Gates, Standards,Innovation, and Antitrust:
IntegratingInnovation Concerns into the Analysis of Collaborative Standard Setting, 47 EMORY
L.J. 583 (1998); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 367 (2001); Daniel F. Spulber, Unlocking Technology:
Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & EcoN. 915 (2008).
4 Moore's Law, coined in 1965 by Gordon Moore (who went on to co-found Intel), predicts
that the number of transistors on chips would double every eighteen months to two years. The
prediction has proven remarkably accurate. See John Markoff, Advances Offer Path to Further
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ness of the markets raised the stakes for antitrust enforcers and courts, because injudicious intervention might well have jeopardized the very
innovation that antitrust seeks to promote. In this article, we examine how
Microsoft resolved these tensions and show how the experience in Microsoft
informed the allegations and the disposition of Intel. We hope this exercise
will help guide future applications of antitrust standards to high-technology
platforms.'
Microsoft and Intel were closely related in fact and law. The platforms at
issue, one software, one hardware, are complementary elements of a larger
platform: the Wintel standard, which combines some version of the Microsoft
Windows operating system with the proprietary architecture of the x86 Intel
central processing unit (CPU).6 Both Microsoft and Intel have had long runs
as leaders of their respective markets, because of both innovation and entry
barriers-closely related characteristics of most platform markets. The government's theories of monopolization in the two cases were also similar in
important respects. In each case, a government plaintiff alleged that a dominant platform vendor illegally maintained a lawfully acquired monopoly in its
home platform market-operating systems in Microsoft and CPUs in Intel.7 In
each case, the government alleged that the defendant attempted to monopolize
the market for a critical complementary product-browsers in Microsoft and
graphics processing units or GPUs in Intel-in an effort to skew the direction
of innovation to the advantage of its own entry in the complementary product
market.' In each case, the platform owner allegedly used various practices,
including product design, to prevent a rival's version of the complement from
becoming, by a process of innovation, a competing platform for other complements. At the remedy stage in Intel, the FTC used the term "predatory innova-

Shrink Computer Chips, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2010, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
08/3 1/science/3 1compute.html?_- r= l&scp=2&sq=%22moore%27s%201aw%22&st=cse. For a
fascinating photoessay of the development of chips, see Kristina Grifantini, Moore's Law, TECH.
REV., Jan. 1, 2009, at 30. 5See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Google and the Limits of Antitrust: The
Case Against the Case Against Google, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171 (2011).
6 For analysis of the incentives facing Microsoft and Intel in their unique relationship, see
Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & David B. Yoffie, Wintel: Cooperation and Conflict, 53 MGMT.
Sci. 584 (2007); David B. Yoffie & Mary Kwak, With FriendsLike These: The Art of Managing
Complementors, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept. 2006, at 89, 93-94 (2006). For potential challenges to
the relationship, see Nick Wingfield, Microsoft Faces the Post-PCWorld, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15,
2011; The End of Wintel, ECONOMIST, July 31, 2010, at 53.
7 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 50-80; Intel Complaint, supra note 2,
47. See John
Graubert & Jesse Gurman, The FTC/Intel Settlement: One Step Forward, One Step Back?, ANTiTRUST, Spring 2011, at 8, 11 (noting that the FTC's case in Intel "most resembled the Department of Justice's long-running litigation with Microsoft").
8 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 80-84; Intel Complaint, supra note 2, 26.
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tion" to describe some of the design measures that allegedly disadvantaged
Intel's rivals or might do so in the future.9
One important set of allegations in Intel went beyond Microsoft-claims
that Intel excluded smaller rival CPU manufacturers AMD and Via by, for
example, imposing contractual restrictions on computer manufacturers
(OEMs). 0 By contrast, none of Microsoft's challenged actions was aimed a
rival producer of operating systems; its only targets were producers of socalled middleware, applications software that threatened to become rivals of
Microsoft in a future market for software platforms. In this essay, we will
limit our focus to the GPU allegations in Intel, those that most closely parallel
the theory in Microsoft and most clearly raise the antitrust issues in the platform owner's relationship with complementors." In particular, we will analyze the parallel claims that Microsoft and Intel each used its control over the
design of a dominant platform to prevent a complementary product from becoming a better substitute for the platform.
In Part I of this essay, we will describe some of the characteristics of platform markets and how innovation often occurs in them. In Part II, we will
consider what antitrust standards should apply in markets like these, especially to issues involving product design. In Part III, we examine issues of
market definition, liability, and remedies. For each of these sets of issues, we
compare how the courts in Microsoft accounted for the issue of innovation in
considering questions of product design and interoperability and compare that
experience with the FTC's treatment of similar issues in its complaint and
consent order in Intel.
I. PLATFORMS AND INNOVATION
A court considering a dominant firm's actions should place them alongside
practices that are normal for firms in the market and thus presumably efficient.' 2 In this Part, we highlight some of the leading characteristics of the
9Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment at 13, Intel Corp., FTC Docket
No. 9341 (Aug. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Analysis of Consent Order], available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/100804intelanal.pdf. The term had been in use long before the settlement. See, e.g, Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1121 (1983).
10Intel Complaint, supra note 2, J 5-7.
"The term complementor was first used in ADAM M. BRANDENBURGER & BARRY J.
NALEBUFF, CO-OPETITION 18 (1996) (suggesting that you are a complementor if "customers
value your product more when they have the other [firm's] product than when they have your
product alone").
12 Alan J. Meese, Monopolization, Exclusion, and the Theory of the Firm, 89 MiNN. L. REV.
743, 793 (2005) (observing that "courts have implemented [S]ection 2's ban on monopolization
by drawing a distinction between 'normal' competitive practices, on the one hand, and 'undue'
or 'unreasonable' restrictions, on the other").
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kinds of markets at issue in Microsoft and Intel. In high-technology markets,
including the markets for personal computers, firms often depend on both
software and hardware platforms to develop their products." A software platform provides application programming interfaces, or APIs, that give developers access to standard functionality they can use to build advanced
applications. In Windows, for example, the API provides file systems, a user
interface, dialog boxes, device drivers, and networking, among many other
services. 14 APIs thus greatly reduce the costs of creating new products because developers only need to create the distinctive functionality that their

own product delivers." The number and popularity of the applications that run
on Windows enhance the value of the platform. Consequently, Microsoft offers extensive support (in over fifty languages) to a network of developers to
create advanced applications to run on Windows.16
A hardware platform provides the physical architecture necessary for
software and peripheral hardware devices to run and provide functionality.
Intel produces microprocessors (central processing units, or CPUs) and related
processors, chipsets, motherboards, and interfaces. The CPU of a personal
computer, together with the operating system and chipset, manages all the
other chips and resources in response to user commands." It keeps track of
time and, again with the chipset, manages the demands of other devices for
system resources'" and does much of the computing necessary to carry out
software applications.19 Because of the innovative efforts of Intel and its ri3 See, e.g., PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION (Annabelle Gawer ed., 2010); ANNABELLE GAWER & MICHAEL A. CUSUMANO, PLATFORM LEADERSHIP: How INTEL, MICROSOFT,
AND Cisco DRIVE INDUSTRY INNOVATION (2002); DAVID S. EVANS, ANDREI HAGIU & RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, INVISIBLE ENGINES: How SOFTWARE PLATFORMS DRIVE INNOVATION AND
TRANSFORM INDUSTRIES (2006).
14

See Overview of the Windows API, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/Aa383723.

15David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, in 1 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 667, 673 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008) (observing that,

by "reducing duplicative costs," APIs "increase ... the supply of applications for the platform
[and] the value of the software platform to end users" and generate "positive feedback effects to
application developers").
16 See the Website of the Microsoft Developer Network, http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/default.aspx.
17 For a more complete description of the CPU's role and its interaction with other internal
components of the PC, see WILLIAM STALLINGS, COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND ARCHITECTURE: DESIGNING FOR PERFORMANCE, ch. 3 (2010). The CPU works closely with the operating

system to manage sharing time between various internal components through the use of
"interrupts."
Is The FTC's pleadings and documents, and the consent decree (and many other unrelated

sources), describe the CPU as "the brains" of the computer. Intel Complaint,supra note 2, 1 33.
The authors do not believe this is a particularly useful metaphor. Personal computers do not
"think." However it is apt to the extent that the computer cannot function without a CPU.
19Our description of the CPU's functionality is necessarily simplified for this article's purposes. For a more complete explanation of how the CPU actually works, see STALLINGS, supra
note 17, at 432-79 (Chapter 12: "Processor Structure and Function").
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vals, summarized colloquially by Moore's Law, the speed of these processors
continuously increases. This "law" carries with it a business imperative: to
sell new, faster chips, Intel must ensure that developers and end-users need
them. 20 Intel therefore must promote innovation in hardware and software that
spurs demand for its chips. 2 1
Hardware and software platforms are multi-sided, placing the platform
owner in the position of negotiating with (and mediating among) actors on all
sides of the market. 22 Microsoft, for example, must deal with applications developers that create the complementary products that give Windows much of
its value; original equipment manufacturers, or OEMs, who install Windows
and applications on new computers; 23 hardware manufacturers whose products
are controlled by drivers in Windows APIs; and end-users.
Intel, similarly, has aggressively asserted its position as developer of the
hardware architecture at the heart of the modem PC. It provides software
firms with business and technical information, including tools and code, they
need to create new products that take advantage of the processing speeds of
new generations of processors.2 4 They also provide interfaces or "buses" that
allow other hardware developers to connect their products to the Intel CPU
and chipset. The bus is significant because it must provide standardized, predictable interfaces between the CPU and memory, printers, keyboards, mice,
peripherals, and the monitor. 25
Particularly important in the FTC's Intel case is the PCI Express (or PCle)
bus, a series of electrical switches and expansion slots that connect the CPU to
third-party chips and resources inside the computer using an industry-standard
CUSUMANO, supra note 13, at 17.
does not face such a powerful imperative because it can sell products to its installed base. It too, however, must upgrade its platform regularly and induce innovation by complementors. See Yoffie & Kwak, supra note 6, at 93.
22 David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON
REG. 325, 328 (2003); see also Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J.
EcON. PERSP., Summer 2009, at 125 (surveying the economic literature on two-sided markets).
23 Microsoft, for example, sells most copies of Windows to OEMs to install on new computers. Because of the importance of this avenue of distribution, Microsoft has an interest in how
its product and other complementary products are presented on the computer desktop. One of the
issues in Microsoft was whether Microsoft or the OEM was a better steward of the public interest
in deciding which applications appeared on the desktop. See also Jonathan M. Barnett, The
Host's Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1861, 1872 (2011).
24 See Intel Software Partner Program, INTEL CORP., http://software.intel.com/partner/home?
locale=en-US.
25 See STALLINGS, supra note 17, ch. 3 (explaining the relationship between computer functions and interconnection devices); GARY B. SHELLY & MISTY E. VERMAAT, DISCOVERING COMPUTERs 2010: LIVING IN A DIGITAL WORLD 237-38 (2010) (describing the function of a
computer bus, and defining the "expansion [type] bus" including PCIe).
20 GAWER &
21 Microsoft
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interface.2 6 Intel designed the original version the PCI bus as a layer that
would allow it to redesign its processors repeatedly without affecting interoperability.27 Scores of manufacturers of expansions and add-ons rely on the
PCIe bus to connect to the CPU.2 8 The most important of these, for purposes
of the Intel litigation, is the graphics processing unit, or GPU, which shares
with the CPU the task of meeting the processing demands of software
applications.
Chipsets are groups of related chips installed on the computer's
motherboard that work with a CPU and a given bus standard to control computer functions.2 9 The CPU relies on the various chips in the chipsets for
delegating specific tasks. For example, in certain Intel computers, the Southbridge chipset connects the CPU to various interfaces, like USB and PCIe
sockets. AMD and Intel make a variety of pre-configured chipsets. 30
The Wintel platform thus forms a durable yet constantly evolving base for
an immense ecosystem of complementary products and related services, all
aimed at providing functionality to end-users, whether consumers or enterprises. As scholars have recently observed, in markets like these, "contracting
for innovation" replaces vertical integration for many functions:
[T]he performance of the product depends on the performance of a series
of independently produced and rapidly developing subsystems .

. .

. The

performance of each of these subsystems depends correlatively on the performance of the others, as transmitted through the architecture-the platform-linking them all.
In each case, the platform owner . .. knows that it could not possibly

produce all or even most of the components or applications whose interplay
creates the platform. In particular, the producer could not develop or sustain
the capacity for cutting-edge innovation in all the necessary areas for the
various components. As a result, collaboration with groups of key technology suppliers, involving continuing mutual adjustment and exchange of
31
quintessentially proprietary knowledge, becomes the norm.
As with other platforms, the Windows system must compete with other plat-

forms with systems of developers and OEMs. To compete effectively, a platform must evolve in response to consumer demand for greater speed and
functionality. As we have seen, Microsoft and Intel must assure interoper26 See SHELLY ET AL., supra note 25, at 238.
27 GAWER & CUSUMANO, supra note 13, at 31.
28 See STALLINGS, supra note 17, at 95.
29
See AIUEs PC MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR: HARDWARE (TEACHER'S EDITION), at

145-46
(4th ed. 2007).
30See id. at 146.
31 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contractingfor Innovation: Vertical
Disintegrationand Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 431, 440 (2009).
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ability through their interfaces and protocols, and must foster innovation by
their systems of developers.
Thus, what might be called the "normal science" of innovation within a
platform occurs in enhancing the functionality of complementary products.3 2
The platform provider facilitates this innovation by providing applications
programming interfaces and other services like software development kits and
technological support. The "revolutionary science" of innovation occurs when
firms challenge the position of the platform itself. Competition among incompatible platforms is characterized by indirect network effects, which place a
premium on building usage share, because the addition of new users makes
the system more attractive to developers and the efforts of new developers in
turn make the system more valuable to still more users.33 Firms in this phase
of platform rivalry engage in aggressive forms of competition like giving
products and services away to buyers on one or more sides of the market.3 4 In
the familiar story, after a period of intense competition between rival incompatible platforms, the market may tip toward one dominant standard.35 Other
platforms may persist, however, because indirect network effects may be exhausted once the number of users reaches a certain level. Tipping, moreover,
is not forever. In some markets, new systems leapfrog old ones again and
again.3 6 New technologies may displace the entire market. Consequently, even
markets that have tipped in the initial stage may remain intensely competitive
as newer products threaten to supplant the incumbent platform.
In Microsoft, the government's case rested on the existence of an "applications barrier to entry" consisting of network effects. 7 The vast array of applications for Windows made it attractive for computer users to choose the
Windows standard rather than another, and the greater number of users
spurred developers to write programs for that standard as well. In Intel, the
FTC alleged startup costs, IP rights, and "product reputation and compatibility" as barriers, but conspicuously omitted any allegation of network effects.38
32 Cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIc REVOLUTIONS 35-42 (3d ed. 1996)
(describing the process of normal research testing the predictions of a scientific paradigm).
33Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 15, at 678; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems
Competition and Network Effects, J. EcON PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 94.
34 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 107; see also Evans, supra note 22, at 367-70; Mark A.
Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1074-75
(1996).
35 Katz & Shapiro, supra note 33, at 107.
36 Barnett, supra note 23, at 1877-78 (describing "precarious" position of platform owner);
Evans, supra note 22, at 365 (describing platform competition in the video game market).
37D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 55-56. The court identified no other barriers to entry into the
OS market.
38Over a decade ago, in an earlier case against Intel, the FTC did allege that network effects
protected Intel's monopoly. Complaint, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9288, at 3, [ 10 (June 8,
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/06/intelcmp.pdf (alleging that network effects
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Nevertheless, given the relationship between their products, Intel and
Microsoft both benefit from similar indirect network effects.
The incentives of the platform vendor are generally, but not entirely, aligned with the consumer interest in its dealings with developers in the process
of normal innovation.3 9 Introduction of new complements, which can create
new markets and foster competition within markets built on the platform,
spurs demand for the platform and provides more and better products to consumers. As we have already shown, platform providers lead innovative efforts
and catalyze innovation by providing necessary interfaces, development kits,
and information about demand. 40 The platform owner thus stands to profit by
the innovative efforts of applications developers that provide services consumers want without impairing the integrity of the platform. If the platform
owner refuses to approve an application, it is probably (though not necessarily) because the application has some shortcoming that undermines the system. Apple, for example, said that it sometimes rejected applications for the
iPhone because its sole carrier at the time, AT&T, "expressed concerns regarding network efficiency and potential network congestion." 41 Even in that
case, Apple later relaxed its guidelines for developers in response to competition from phones running, for example, Google's Android operating system. 42
enabled Intel to win "commitments from many computer manufacturers and software vendors to
build computers and write software for Intel's new 64-bit Merced microprocessor, even though
the product will not be available for nearly two years") For discussion of that case, see Randal
C. Picker, Regulating Network Industries: A Look at Intel, 23 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 159
(1999).
39See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 85, 105-19 (2003) (describing the limits of the platform owner's incentives to "internalize complementary efficiencies"); Geoffrey Parker & Marshall W. Van Alstyne, Innovation,
Openness, and Platform Control (Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract id=1079712; Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1943, 1951 (2009).
40 David S. Evans, How Catalysts Ignite: The Economics of Platform-Based Start-Ups, in
PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 99.
41 Erica Ogg, Apple Sheds Light on App Store Approval Process, CNET NEWS.coM (Aug.
21,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-10315328-37.html. The task of reviewing applications for approval is formidable:
Apple says it receives 8,500 new applications and updates to existing ones every week.
There are 40 people responsible for reviewing every application submitted and each
app gets reviewed by two people. Eighty percent are approved as submitted with no
changes necessary, and 95 percent of applications are approved in two weeks or less.
In total, since the App Store was opened last year, Apple says it has evaluated 200,000
apps and updates.
Id.
42 Jenna Wortham, Apple Gives App Developers Its Review Guidelines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9,
2010 (reporting industry analysts interpreted the new guidelines as "a sign that Apple was growing increasingly aware of competition in the smartphone market, and was trying to be friendlier
to the developers whose applications have helped drive the success of its products"). But cf Neil
McAllister, Apple Tightens Its Grip on Developers with Mac App Store, INFOWORLD (Oct. 28,
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Thus far, we have focused on the role of the platform owner in fostering
innovation by complementors. But, in some instances, the platform owner
may choose to compete with its complementors or to displace them by adding
its own functionality to the platform itself.43 For example, if the complementary product market is monopolized, the platform owner may enter it to eliminate inefficient double marginalization.44 Or the platform owner may believe
that it can provide a better or less expensive complement than those currently
available. One study found that platform owners are more likely to integrate
into "connector" markets, which are "functionally located between the platform and the applications" in a "stack of complementary markets," 45 because
they define the larger platform's architecture and interface. For example, after
Intel developed the first PCI bus in 1994, exponentially increasing the speed
of connections within the PC, it decided that other chipset suppliers were lagging in manufacturing and distribution of the necessary technology and took
that task on itself.4 6 Other connector markets that Intel has entered are
motherboards and chipsets, including chipsets with integrated GPUs.
The challenge for the platform owner is to produce a platform and complements that create the fastest and most capable overall platform without deterring innovation by rival manufacturers of complements, who fear being
wholly dependent on a competitor. 47 Intel, for example, created internal divisions as separate profit centers with the conflicting missions of entering markets and subsidizing entry in the same markets by others, mainly by
2010) (observing that "while desktop applications are both more complex and costlier to produce
than smartphone apps, Apple seems to want to hold developers to the same terms and standards
for both, even as it competes for the same markets with its own software"), http://
www.infoworld.com/d/developer-world/apple-tightens-its-grip-developers-mac-app-store-319.
43 See Annabelle Gawer & Rebecca Henderson, Platform Owner Entry and Innovation in
Complementary Markets: Evidence from Intel, 16 J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 2 (2007)
("[A]lthough some models suggest that entry in complementary markets is always optimal for a
platform owner, others suggest that in some circumstances a platform owner's ability to commit
not to enter complementary markets may be important to preserving complementors' incentives
to innovate.").
44 Double marginalization occurs when "separate complementary monopolies, each imposing
a monopoly markup, wind up with a final product price that exceeds the overall monopoly
price." Farrell &Weiser, supra, note 39, at 98. See also Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration
and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 261 (2002) (noting that
"[v]ertical integration ... allow[s] the combined entity to ignore the appropriate transfer price
and instead focus solely on the price charged for the final delivery of the service . . . [thus
allowing] the entity to eliminate the markup charged by the content provider and price the final
good closer to the welfare-maximizing level").
45 Gawer & Henderson, supra note 43, at 10; see also Thomas R. Eisenmann, Geoffrey Parker
& Marshall Van Alstyne, Opening Platforms: How, When and Why?, in PLATFORMS, MARKETS
AND INNOVATION, supra note 13, at 131, 146-49.
46 Gawer & Henderson, supra note 43, at 12.
47 Id. at 6-7; Barnett, supra note 23, at 1879-81 (describing the dilemma facing platform
owners to persuade potential adopters that it will not later exploit switching costs to expropriate
value from them, if they are successful).
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development assistance and sharing of intellectual property. 48 Twitter, according to some reports, considered building the functionality of some third-party
applications into the Twitter platform. Twitter's leading investor explained
this move by distinguishing applications that "fill holes" in a platform (e.g.,
photo sharing) from "killer apps" that "create something entirely new on top"
of the platform (e.g., social gaming): "Twitter really should have had [the
hole-filling applications] when it launched or it should have built those services right into the Twitter experience." 49 Developers, he suggested, should
focus on the killer apps and leave the hole-filling to Twitter.
But which applications fill holes and which are killer add-ons is not something that can be decided for all time at any moment. As one industry analyst
has observed, a platform can be a utility for other firms' applications, a suite
of the platform owner's applications, or anything in between. The platform
vendor must consider and reconsider where it wants to be on the continuum:
If Twitter were to have continued its role as utility, it is hard to see how it
could have generated an acceptable return for its investors (and sustained
itself over the long run). If, conversely, it decided to go head-to-head with
the developer community on all fronts, it would have made a lot of money in

the short run but stifled innovation that would have damaged its long-run
prospects for value maximization. However, it has chosen likely the most
difficult but most rewarding path, that of providing the functionality of a
utility while also owning pieces of the application value stack. This has created a delicate balancing act with the developer community that will take
time to play out, and will require far better communication with the community than it has had to date. But when the dust settles Twitter will control the
most valuable engine of monetization-mobile advertising-while enabling
others to earn significant profits from their own applications. This potential
for profits will continue to draw in elements of the developer community
most consistent with the white space Twitter has left open, driving innovation that will further attract new users and potential ad dollars for the mother
ship. Near term pain and discomfort for long-term gain.so
A platform owner's decision to add new functionality to the platform itself
will ordinarily depend, as the Coase theory of the firm suggests,' on whether
the owner can perform that function better or at lower cost internally than by
contracting with application developers.5 2 Both platform vendors and develop-

Gawer & Henderson, supra note 43, at 18-21.
Fred Wilson, The Twitter Platform's Inflection Point,AVC: MUSINGS OF A VC INNY (Apr.
7, 2010), http://www.avc.com/a-vc/2010/04/the-twitter-platform.html.
50Roger Ehrenberg, Twitter: Optimizing Long-term Value, INFORMATION ARBITRAGE (Apr.
13, 2010), http://www.informationarbitrage.com/2010/04/twitter-optimizing-longterm-value.
html.
1' Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcONOMICA 386, 392 (1937).
52 Cf. David S. Evans & Michael A. Salinger, The Role of Cost in Determining When Firms
Offer Bundles, 56 J. INDUS. EcoN. 143 (2008) (arguing that, where there are high fixed costs,
48

49
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ers have incentives to enhance the attractiveness of the system. The network
effects of the larger system operate to the benefit of both the platform owner
and developers by creating greater incentives for the users and new developers to choose their system over others. Consequently, the platform owner's
choice to integrate functionality will usually have efficiency justifications.
If a platform owner's move supplants a complementor or limits a complementor's interoperabilityj the disfavored complementor may suspect that the
platform owner's action is predatory, especially if the complementor aspires
to become a platform in its own right.5 4 These concerns cannot be rejected
based on the considerations we have outlined in this section, because bundling
and denials of interoperation may be inefficient." The platform owner may
have an incentive to use its position as a gatekeeper to thwart the development
of a complementor's product that competes with one of the platform owner's
complements or that threatens to become a rival platform. As Philip Weiser
has observed, platform owners are in a position to reduce social welfare by
deterring innovation that "facilitat[es] competition in the platform market itself or undermin[es] the ability of the rival platform provider to engage in
price discrimination."56 This concern underlies the government cases in both
Microsoft and Intel and is the basis for their intervention in both platform
owners' design choices.

bundling may be an efficient way of providing goods to consumers with various tastes, even if
few want both components).
53 See, e.g., Chun-Hui Miao, Limiting Compatibility in Two-Sided Markets, 8 REV. NETWORK
EcON. 346 (2009) (showing that, in a two-sided market, a monopolist may have an incentive to
limit compatibility with complementary products in order to extract surplus from users on both
sides of the market).
54 Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194 (2002) (arguing that tying of a
complementary product in one time period can forestall entry by a rival producer of the complementary product into its monopoly market in a later time period); see also Joseph Farrell &
Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets, 48 J. INDUS.
EcON. 413, 430 (2000) (showing that innovation and forward integration may be "inefficient to
the extent that they are driven by the pecuniary gains from lower prices in the complement rather
than by internalization of real externalities from innovation"); Barry Nalebuff, Bundling as an
Entry Barrier,Q.J. EcON. 159 (2004) (arguing that a monopolist of complementary goods can
deter entry in both markets by bundling); Martin Peitz, Bundling May Blockade Entry, 26 Iwr'L
J. INDUs. ORG. 41 (2006) (describing conditions under which bundling can prevent entry and
reduce welfare).
ss Farrell & Weiser, supra note 39, at 110-11 (describing the platform owner's incentive to
limit potential competition); Gawer & Henderson, supra note 43, at 4 (observing that "the literature exploring a monopolist's incentive to enter the market for complements is subtle and complex, and whether a monopolist will choose to enter complementary markets or as to whether
such entry will enhance or reduce social welfare cannot be answered unequivocally").
56 Philip Weiser, Regulating Interoperability: Lessons from AT&T, Microsoft, and Beyond,
76 ANrrRUST L.J. 271, 291-92 (2009).
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II. PLATFORMS AND ANTITRUST
In this section, we consider how antitrust standards for platform markets
might foster innovation. The task is complicated because antitrust can best
promote innovation by intervening in platform design decisions or by declining to intervene, depending upon the circumstances.17 Antitrust law has, for
example, struggled to define the exceptions to the "right" of even dominant
firms like leading platform owners to choose with whom they wish to deal."
Aspen Skiing suggested that a dominant firm could not withdraw from a longstanding arrangement with a rival, if doing so harmed consumers. 9 More recently, Trinko characterized the holding in Aspen as setting "the outer
boundary" of an antitrust duty to deal.60 Nevertheless, "even the Trinko dictum will not erase the role for antitrust oversight of cooperation (or lack
thereof) between rivals in network industries." 6 1
The experience in Microsoft (including some cautionary lessons from the
courts' missteps) provides a benchmark for later courts and agencies applying
monopolization standards in platform markets, particularly on issues of product design and interoperability. It suggests how a court or agency should consider the special role of platforms in the process of innovation when it
identifies monopoly power, evaluates exclusionary conduct, and shapes remedies. Intel provides a useful illustration of how well the lessons of Microsoft
have been learned.
Both sides in Microsoft stood for innovation. The government argued that
Microsoft's integration of its browser with Windows and its restrictive agreements with computer manufacturers (OEMs), among others, hampered innovation by preventing Netscape's browser and the Java technologies from
5' Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 247, 253 (2007) (observing that although "the social losses that result from innovation restraints are immense ...
identifying anticompetitive innovation restraints has proven to be very difficult and development
of suitable remedies even more problematic").
5 See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) ("The freedom to switch
suppliers lies close to the heart of the competitive process that the antitrust laws seek to encourage."); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
59 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
6o Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004).
61 Weiser, supra note 56, at 273; see also John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining
and Monopolization: In Search of the "Boundary of Section 2 Liability" Between Aspen and
Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115 (2005); Howard A. Shelanski, UnilateralRefusals to Deal in
Intellectual and Other Property, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 369, 390-94 (2009) (arguing, based on an
error-cost analysis, that a rule of per se legality for unilateral refusals to deal is unwarranted);
Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and the Internet: The
Hidden Side of Trinko, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1822, 1900-01 (2007) (identifying the potential
transaction costs and perverse effects on innovation from unduly broad mandates of platform
access).
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evolving into a platform for software applications that could rival Windows.
Microsoft responded that the enhancement of Windows by the integration of a
critical new function like Web browsing was innovation itself and its dealings
with OEMs, Internet Access Providers, and software developers were part and
parcel of its role in promoting Windows platform for other firms' innovative
efforts. The great challenge for the courts was to frame and to apply antitrust
standards that could assess these narratives and impose remedies that would
stop conduct that harmed innovation, but still permit conduct that was itself
innovative.
Some have argued that antitrust should have little or no role in high-technology platform markets because the rate of innovation makes antitrust intervention unnecessary. 62 Others argue, however, that the presence of network
effects can make the consequences of the anticompetitive conduct more durable by giving the platform leader a dominant position.63 The D.C. Circuit in
Microsoft sugested that "the economic consequences of network effects and
technological dynamism act to offset one another, thereby making it difficult
to formulate categorical antitrust rules absent a particularized analysis of a
given market."M The court recognized that a platform's dominance "may be
temporary, because innovation may alter the field altogether." 65 Competition
in platform markets, in other words, often proceeds "sequentially" rather than
"simultaneously." Nevertheless, even if the market is "uniquely dynamic in
the long term," a dominant platform may have monopoly power in the short
term, particularly if the platform owner can exploit its position to extend its
dominance. 66 The central position of the platform leader gives it unusual influence over the success or failure of complementors and rivals. Even if competition between platforms is for the market rather than within the market, the
competition should still be subject to an appropriate level of antitrust scrutiny.
Courts confronted with antitrust claims in platform markets must, however,
be aware of the forms the competition is likely to take and be ready to distinguish the malign from the benign, even where they look similar in outward
appearance. Active competition in platform markets may look like predation

62

See, e.g., Virginia Postrel, What Really Scares Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at

A25.
63 Platform owners may also gain a measure of dominance if standards-setting organizations
approve standards that include their intellectual property. For discussion of the complex issues
involved in the application of antitrust standards to conduct before SSOs, see Salil K. Mehra,
ParadiseIs a Walled Garden? Trust, Antitrust, and User Dynamism, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV.
889, 939-47 (2011).
64 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 50.
65 Id. at 49.
66 Id. at 57. The same result holds even though the monopolist continues to innovate: "because
innovation can increase an already dominant market share and further delay the emergence of
competition, even monopolists have reason to invest in R&D." Id.
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67
in other markets, as firms try to become (or to maintain) the market standard.
Legitimate actions of a platform owner in improving its platform or protecting
the platform's integrity may seem only to protect its dominant position from
revolutionary innovative efforts of its complementors. For example, a platform owner's efforts to enhance its platform by design choices, including integration of new functionality into the platform, may harm complementors by
reducing the price of that functionality (perhaps to zero) or by completely or
partially excluding the complementor's product from the platform.6 1

The technological complexity of platform markets also makes it difficult
for courts to identify and remedy anticompetitive actions, particularly design
choices, in time to improve matters. The second district judge in Microsoft
likened her task to "trying to shoe a galloping horse."69 Mistaken applications
of antitrust rules will be more costly in platform markets if they hinder innovation by the platform owner.
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged all of these concerns in framing its approach in Microsoft but did not shrink from examining Microsoft's conduct,
even on issues of product design. Its monopolization standard required the
plaintiff to prove that the practice harmed the "competitive process [in the
market for operating systems] and thereby harmed consumers" rather than
merely competitors. 0 If the plaintiff carried this burden, the defendant was
required to offer a procompetitive justification for its act, "a nonpretextual
claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it
involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal."' If
the defendant established a plausible justification, the plaintiff was required
either to rebut it or to show, in a rule-of-reason inquiry, that the anticompeti2
tive harm outweighs it.7
The first two steps of the analysis disposed of all of the government's contentions: if the practice was not anticompetitive in a relevant sense, or if
67Lemley, supra note 34, at 1074-75.
68Cf. Sang-Yong Tom Lee & W. Wayne Fu, Software-Platform Integration,Incompatibility,
and System-User Switching, 19 J. MEDIA EcON. 163, 190 (2006) (finding "a theoretical basis for
the view that an integrated supplement-base company can indeed drive out its competitors by
making its supplement subsidiary's product incompatible with or unavailable to users of a competing base").
69New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 184 (D.D.C. 2002) (D.D.C. States Remedy 2002), aff'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(D.C. Circuit 2004) ("Thus, although the remedy crafted by the Court is undoubtedly forwardlooking, it is beyond the capacity of this Court, counsel, or any witness, to craft a remedy in
2002, for antitrust violations which commenced in the mid-1990s, which will be appropriately
tailored to the needs of a rapidly changing industry in 2012.").
70 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
71 Id. at 59.
72Id.
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Microsoft justified it by valid efficiency considerations, the practice was lawful; if it was anticompetitive and unjustified, it was unlawful. Crucially, the
court did not require proof of anticompetitive effects in the usual sensehigher prices and lower output. At least in the unusual circumstances in
Microsoft,7 3 it was sufficient to "infer causation when exclusionary conduct is
aimed at producers of nascent competitive technologies" because "neither
plaintiffs nor the court can confidently reconstruct a product's hypothetical
technological development in a world absent the defendant's exclusionary
conduct." 74 A monopolist should not be given "free reign to squash nascent,
albeit unproven, competitors at will-particularly in industries marked by
rapid technological advance and frequent paradigm shifts."" Instead, it should
be "made to suffer the uncertain consequences of its own undesirable
conduct." 76
Thus, liability hinged on whether the conduct was "undesirable." What the
court considered undesirable became clear as it addressed specific practices.
In essence, a practice was undesirable if it hurt nascent rivals without obviously helping consumers. If the practice provided sufficiently obvious consumer benefits-for example, by providing a demonstrably better product or
the same product at a lower price, either to end-users or complementors-then
it was not anticompetitive at all, regardless of how seriously it hurt rivals. If
the practice hurt Netscape or Java by limiting usage share while providing less
obvious consumer benefits, the court might conclude that the practice was
anticompetitive but would consider efficiency justifications.7 7 This approach
ran the risk of costly false positives-error costs that might be harder to correct, especially in dynamic markets, than the false negatives that a more exact73One court has recently emphasized that the plaintiff must prove that "suppression of nascent
threats . . . had an actual adverse effect on competition in the relevant market." Princo Corp. v.
ITC, 616 F.3d 1318, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010). That required the plaintiff to show that "there was a
'reasonable probability' that the [nascent] technology, if available for licensing, would have matured into a competitive force in the [relevant] market" and not merely a "speculative possibility
that [the nascent technology] could have overcome the barriers to its technical feasibility and
commercial success." Id.
74 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 79 (emphasis added).
75Id.

76Id. (quoting 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, AwrrrausT LAW 65 1c, at 78
(1996)).
77Microsoft's license restrictions and design choices that hindered OEMs' flexibility in configuring new computers, including its removal of programs in Windows, were anticompetitive,
on the theory that OEMs would only act to benefit consumers. Contracts and dealings with
complementors that directly limited their ability to deal with rivals' products were potentially
anticompetitive.
The court condemned various measures aimed at limiting the ability of other complementors
to distribute Netscape's browser or Java. In each instance, the court found that the practices had
no business justification and specifically rejected Microsoft's assertion that it had a legitimate
business interest in keeping developers focused on the Windows API.
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ing standard of proof of anticompetitive effect might entail.7 8 Nevertheless,
the court's approach did take seriously Microsoft's role as an innovator and a
competitor. Moreover, it mitigated the potential overbreadth of the standard of
liability by reintroducing the issue of causation in framing remedies, which
we also address in the next Part.
The legal standards in Microsoft provide a basis for evaluating Intel. Although the settlement in Intel, by its nature, does not identify a guiding standard of liability,79 the parties negotiated it in the shadow of the standards that
they expected the courts to apply.s0 The parties probably expected Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act standards to be similar to those applied in
Microsoft under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, the FTC, in all likelihood, prepared to prove that Intel's conduct harmed the competitive process
in the market for CPUs and thereby harmed consumers, not just its rivals.
Intel undoubtedly prepared to show that its acts obviously provided consumer
benefits by improving speed, functionality, and efficiency. The settlement reflects an accommodation of these concerns.
In its complaint, the FTC asserted (at least as a fallback position) that Section 5 might reach conduct that does not violate Section 2.81 But there is no
82
reason to believe courts would agree, at least in this instance. One of us has
argued elsewhere that Section 5 has no broader reach than Section I of the
Sherman Act in regulating agreements in restraint of trade because antitrust
policy considerations, not the statutory text, determine the content of Section

7 See William H. Page, Microsoft and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
33 (2010) (applying to the Microsoft case the error-cost framework of Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. I (1984)).
7 Analysis of Consent Order, supra note 9, at 2 ("The prohibitions and standards utilized in
the Proposed Consent Order do not necessarily reflect the applicable legal standards under the
Sherman Act, Clayton Act, or the FTC Act; indeed, the legal standards applicable to some of
these practices remain unsettled by the Supreme Court and the federal courts of appeal.").
80Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
81Intel Complaint, supra note 2, 1 1 (emphasizing power to stop anticompetitive acts in their
incipiency).
82 One FTC Commissioner has argued that Section 5 reaches unilateral conduct not covered
by Section 2. J. Thomas Rosch, The FTC's Section 5 Hearings: New Standards for Unilateral
Conduct?, Remarks Before ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting (Mar. 25, 2009), available at
http://www2.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/090325abaspring.pdf. But Commissioner Rosch is careful to
identify "unique circumstances" and "limiting principles" that justify any departure from
Microsoft's standards for identifying exclusionary conduct. Id. at 5-6. He argued, for example,
that N-Data's disavowal of an earlier commitment to license patents that a standards-setting body
had adopted violated Section 5 even if it was not exclusionary under Section 2. Consent Order,
Negotiated Data Solutions, LLC, FTC Docket No. C-4234 (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/nds.shtm. Intel did not involve a comparable official standards-setting
context, possibly justifying a standard different from the one applied by the D.C. Circuit in
Microsoft.
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l's requirement of concerted action.83 The same reasoning suggests that Section 5 has no broader reach than Section 2 of the Sherman Act in cases alleging monopolization by platform vendors. "Monopolization," from a purely
lexical viewpoint, is no less inclusive than "unfair methods of competition."
Given the breadth of the statutory terms, courts have necessarily defined their
reach by reference to the error costs associated with intervention, not by their
literal meanings, whatever those might be.
Consider the FTC's assertion in Intel that Section 5 extends to incipient"
and "synergistic" anticompetitive effects. The DOJ made similar allegations
in Microsoft, but the court of appeals reversed as unsupported the district
court's holding that Microsoft's entire course of conduct amounted to a violation separate from its individual acts." On the other hand, the court recognized that conduct could be unlawful even without proof that the conduct had
presently reduced output or raised prices. There is no reason to think that the
FTC is in a position to identify still more incipient anticompetitive effects
with sufficient accuracy to justify the increased error costs of intervention.
The aftermath of the Microsoft case gives additional reason for caution in
the application of a standard of incipiency. Important outcomes in the case
hinged on predictions of the future course of technological change. The liability holding, for example, rested on the court's prediction that Netscape's
browser could become a platform rival of Windows and thus lower the applications barrier to entry protecting the Windows monopoly. 6 Microsoft and
Netscape both bought into this prediction, at least early on, 7 and the court of
appeals accepted it as a basis for upholding liability for unjustified competitive harm to a nascent rival, even in the absence of traditional proof of that
Microsoft had harmed competition. 8 The protocol licensing requirement,
which the parties included in the negotiated settlement, was aimed at ensuring
William H. Page, The FTC's ProceduralAdvantage in Discovering Concerted Action, ANSOURCE, Feb. 2009, at 1-2, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/02/FebO9Page2-26f.pdf.
8 Intel Complaint, supra note 2, 1 1 (asserting that "where a respondent that has monopoly
power engages in a course of conduct tending to cripple rivals or prevent would-be rivals from
constraining its exercise of that power, and where such conduct cumulatively or individually has
anticompetitive effects or has a tendency to lead to such effects, that course of conduct falls
within the scope of Section 5") (emphasis added).
85 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 78.
86Id. at 53.
87 Bill Gates presented it in his "Internet Tidal Wave" memo. Memorandum from Bill Gates to
Executive Staff and Direct Reports at Microsoft 4 (May 26, 1995) [hereinafter Internet Tidal
Wave memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/msexhibits.htm (Exhibit 20). Netscape presented it in a White Paper urging government action against Microsoft. Gary Reback &
Susan Creighton, White Paper Regarding Recent Anticompetitive Conduct of Microsoft Corporation 48-51 (July 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
88D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 79 (because "neither plaintiffs nor the court can confidently
reconstruct a product's hypothetical technological development in a world absent the defendant's
83
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that server-based middleware would also become a platform rival." In neither
case did technology develop as predicted. Windows faces growing competition, but it comes from other quarters, such as Web services, tablets, and
handheld devices.9 0 There is some reason to think that the government misperceived the likely course of innovation in Intel also, as we explain more
fully in the next Part. This experience that courts should scrutinize the competitors' and litigants' predictions of the competitive effects of platform design choices.
III. APPLYING ANTITRUST STANDARDS IN
PLATFORM MARKETS
In Microsoft, the courts took account of the platform's central role in innovation in defining markets; identifying genuinely exclusionary conduct, including actions affecting product design and interoperability; and framing
remedies. Those analyses help us interpret the complaint and the consent order in Intel.

A.

MARKET DEFINITION

The courts in Microsoft defined the relevant market as operating systems
for Intel-compatible personal computers. The unique role of operating systems
as platforms for the full-featured computer programs ruled out multitudes of
other software platforms, like operating systems for handheld devices and
"middleware"-applications with platform capabilities. "Consumers could
not," the court found, "now abandon their operating systems and switch to
middleware in response to a sustained price for Windows above the competitive level." 9'
Paradoxically, however, the government's case rested on its contention that
Microsoft injured competition in the market for operating systems by excluding two middleware products, Netscape's browser and Sun's Java. Netscape's
browser, as Bill Gates himself observed, might "commoditize the underlying
exclusionary conduct" so Microsoft must "suffer the uncertain consequences of its own undesirable conduct").
89 D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 129 (observing that § III.E of the remedy
keeps open "the new model of the 'platform threat' ").
90See, e.g., Wingfield, supra note 6. Web services, admittedly, are accessed generally through
a browser or with browsing technology, but in almost all cases, any browser will do; browserspecific network effects do not exist, as the court in Microsoft itself recognized. D.C. Circuit
2001, 253 F.3d at 84 ("Not only did plaintiffs fail to articulate a website barrier to entry theory in
either their brief or at oral argument, they failed to point the court to evidence in the record that
would support a finding that Microsoft would likely erect significant barriers to entry upon acquisition of a dominant market share."). Consequently, it was doubtful from the outset that Netscape
could ever have evolved into a platform rival to Windows.
' D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 54.
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operating system"92 if it became a platform that would allow developers to
write programs that would run on any operating system. By delaying innovation by Netscape and Java, the government argued, Microsoft hindered their
development as a rival platform and preserved the "applications barrier to
entry" or network effects shielding Windows' dominance of the market for
operating systems. Microsoft argued that, if middleware products were victims, then middleware must be in the relevant market. But the court avoided
this contradiction by classifying Netscape's browser and Java as nascent competitors-not presently in the market, but posing a sufficient threat to alter the
platform market to Microsoft's disadvantage to warrant protection against
Microsoft's depredations. 93
Ostensibly applying the same criteria of market definition, however, the
court held that the government had failed to establish the existence of a
browser market,9 4 at least one sheltered by network effects.95 This finding not
only meant that Microsoft had not attempted to monopolize a market for
browsers, but also that Microsoft did not compete with Netscape in any defined market. Netscape's browser was a nascent competitor of Microsoft only
in the speculative sense that it might compete with Microsoft in a market for
platforms that might, through a process of innovation, exist in the future.
In Intel, the FTC alleged that the defendant had monopolized a set of markets for CPUs and attempted to monopolize a set of markets for GPUs. As in
Microsoft, the contentions of anticompetitive effect depended on proof of the
existence of these markets-something the FTC avoided by settling. On the
surface, however, the connection between the alleged markets and the alleged
anticompetitive effects are clearer in Intel than in Microsoft. First, Intel included allegations of harm to present smaller rivals (AMD and Via) in a market in which Intel has monopoly power (CPUs). Second, the competitive
relationship between the platform market and the complementary good market
(GPUs) has a long and informative history. We will focus here on the second
of these competitive relationships.
The FTC alleged that Intel sought to hinder the development of rivals'
GPUs. 96 A GPU is special-purpose hardware that handles graphics calcula92United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 29 (D.D.C. 1999), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
93D.C. Cir. 2001, 253 F.3d at 54 (reasoning that "no contradiction exists" because "middleware's threat is only nascent" and Section 2 can reach products that are not "already well
developed enough to serve as present substitutes").
4Id. at 81-82. The government's failure in this respect was so complete that it was given no
opportunity to prove the existence of a browser market on remand. Id.
95Id. at 82-84.
96 The GPU is defined in the Consent Decree as: "one or more integrated circuit(s) that: (i) is
the primary graphics processing unit in a Computer Product; (ii) is capable of performing real-
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tions much faster than the CPU, which must also manage the system. A discrete or dedicated GPU combines a graphics processor with dedicated
memory and a cooling system into a unit that plugs into an expansion slot on
the computer's motherboard. Most GPUs, however, are integrated with a
chipset and depend on the system's memory and cooling system. These integrated GPUs, produced by Intel, AMD, and others, are less capable of performing the most advanced graphics functions but are sufficient for most
users. Intel has a large and growing share in the GPU market but produces
only integrated GPUs. NVidia and AMD's ATI subsidiary account for virtually all sales of dedicated or discrete GPUs. 7 Hardware manufacturers typically sell systems preconfigured with an integrated graphics processor or a
dedicated GPU, depending upon the user's preferences. High-end laptops may
include both, allowing the user to select between the greater processing power
of the dedicated GPU and the lower power usage of the integrated GPU.
According to the FTC, Nvidia and AMD had a lead in innovation in General Purpose GPUs (GP-GPUs), 9 8 which threatened to take over more of the
functions of the CPU and thereby to "marginalizeIntel's long-standing CPUcentric, x86-based strategy."99 GP-GPUs provide certain non-graphics
processing functions typically found in the CPU. Games and high-end mathematical and scientific applications can use the GP-GPU for certain kinds of
non-graphics calculations, if they are programmed to do so. 0 Moreover,
time graphics rendering tasks separate from that Computer Product's Relevant Microprocessor
Product; (iii) does not provide the primary interface between the Computer System's Relevant
Microprocessor Product and storage (including without limitation a hard disk drive); and (iv)
does not provide the primary interface between the Computer System's Relevant Microprocessor
Product and input devices (including without limitation a keyboard)." Intel Order, supra note 2,
§ I.EE.
9 Cyril Kowaliski, GPU Sales Strong as AMD Gains Market Share, TECHREPORT.COM (Oct.
27, 2008), http://techreport.com/discussions.x/15778. AMD and Nvidia have defended claims
that they fixed prices for their products. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 253
F.R.D. 478 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (ruling on motions of various putative classes of plaintiffs for
certification).
9 Intel Complaint,supra note 2, I 15 ("The GPU markets are highly concentrated and dominated by Intel. Intel currently lags behind its competitors in both quality and innovation for both
discrete GPUs (GPUs used on separate graphics cards) and integrated GPUs (GPUs integrated
into computer chipsets). Intel's market share in the GPU markets is in excess of 50 percent.").
9 Id. 1 16 (emphasis added); see also Chris Edwards, Graphical Future, 4 ENG'G & TECH.,
June 6, 2009, at 36 (describing Nvidia's claim that the GPU's architecture is more efficient in
processing data than the CPU architecture, and will eventually replace it).
0 See NASSER KEHTARNAVAZ & MARK GAMADIA, REAL-TIME IMAGE AND VIDEO PROCESSING 40-41 (2006) ("Due to their floating-point calculation capabilities, the increased levels of
programmability, and the fact that GPUs can be found in almost every desktop PC today, many
researchers have been looking into ways to exploit GPUs for applications other than the realtime rendering of 3D computer graphics, an area of research referred to as general-purpose
processing on the graphics processing unit (GPGPU).") (emphasis added); see also Edwards,
supra note 99, at 37 (describing the need to educate programmers to write to the GPU's
capabilities).
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"GPUs also could facilitate new entry or expansion in the relevant CPU mar0
kets by other firms, such as Nvidia, AMD, or Via"o'
if OEMs combined their
advanced GPUs with cheaper, more rudimentary CPUs.' 02
This story is plausible because the distribution of processing tasks between
the CPU and GPU has changed over time. The CPU originally performed the
calculations for all of the computer's functions, including graphics.' With
the introduction of graphic interfaces like Windows and graphics-intensive
applications,'0 hardware developers moved graphics calculations to a discrete
GPU on a separate plug-in card with its own memory and cooling devices. 0
Microsoft added APIs to Windows to support GPUs.106 More recently, Intel
and AMD's innovation has moved the graphics processing back to the
motherboard in the form of integrated GPUs'07 and integrated CPU-GPUs.
Nvidia's innovation has moved some non-graphics processing onto the GPU
through the development of GP-GPUs. Both the CPU and the GPU are thus
capable of taking on more or less of the processing functions of the PC, depending upon developers' programming choices and technological changes.
There are limits, however, to the kinds of functionality that the GPU can
perform. GPUs are efficient in performing the calculations necessary for massively parallel tasks like complex graphics and certain scientific modeling applications. CPUs, however, are necessary for performing non-computing tasks
and for the computations necessary for serial tasks, which are essential in
everyday computing.'"0 Thus, while CPUs and GPUs are becoming more fully
101Intel Complaint, supra note 2, 17.
'm One such model of this combination might be Nvidia's Ion motherboard, which pairs a lowend Intel Atom CPU with an Nvidia GeForce 9400M integrated GPU to produce results that rival
those of systems with more advanced CPUs. See Edwards, supra note 99, at 36-38. Another
might be the Nvidia's Tegra motherboard for handheld devices, which pairs an ARM processor
with an Nvidia GPU. Interestingly, in this device, the GPU takes on functions from the browser,
which was the focus of the Microsoft case. Id. at 38.
103Even the earliest personal computers required a video card (not, at this stage, a graphics
accelerator) to display either text or graphics. In this configuration, the CPU performed all graphics calculations.
14 Early versions of Windows were slow and prone to freezing because the graphic user interface taxed the CPU, which was already busy doing all the other computing tasks it was designed
to perform. Mainly the separate graphics board handles the extraordinary number of calculations
necessary to draw graphical interfaces, 3-D games and simulations, and high-end design applications. For example, a few years ago, when one of us (Page) wanted to add a second monitor to
his system, and rotate the monitors to a portrait orientation, he discovered that he needed to add
more advanced GPU.
1os A company called S3 sold the first replaceable plug-in graphics accelerator board in 1991.
106By providing graphics APIs in Windows ("Direct3d" and later "DirectX"), Microsoft sheltered software developers from having to code for every possible dedicated graphics controller.
1o7Integrated GPUs, which are installed as chipsets on the motherboard, are generally less
capable of high-end graphics because they share memory with the GPU.
1os See NCSA (Nat'l Ctr. for Supercomputing Applications), NCSA Answers Questions About
GPU Computing (Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.ncsa.illinois.edu/News/Stories/GPUcomputing/.
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integrated, GPUs cannot entirely displace CPUs, and it is unclear that advanced GPUs, including GP-GPUs, can be combined with simple CPUs to
deliver the same computing power for a normal range of uses. Moreover, for
any application to rely on the GPU, it must be reprogrammed at substantial
cost.1o9

B.

EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT, ESPECIALLY PRODUCT DESIGN
AND INTEROPERATION

Both Microsoft and Intel involved claims that a platform owner had intentionally, limited competition by its product design choices. Microsoft integrated browsing functionality with Windows in ways that provided benefits to
users but that also limited the ability of OEMs and end-users to delete that
functionality and the code that provided it. The courts considered overlapping
aspects of these design changes as tying under Section 1 and monopolization
under Section 2. Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's
holding that Microsoft's design choices illegally tied Internet Explorer (IE) to
Windows on the ground that the district court should have applied the rule of
reason rather than the per se rule," 0 but it affirmed most of the district court's
holdings that Microsoft had monopolized the market for operating systems by
many of the same design choices."'
The D.C. Circuit's sensitivity to the role of platforms in innovation is most
obvious in its consideration of the appropriate tying standard under Section 1
of the Sherman Act. The court concluded that the per se rule was inappropriate to ties involving "technological integration of added functionality into
2
software that serves as a platform for third-party applications"" because per
se analysis takes account of efficiencies only indirectly by asking whether
there is a separate consumer demand for the tied product; if there is no such
demand, then there are probably substantial efficiencies associated with selling the tying and tied products together." 3 But this test, the court observed, is
"backward-looking and therefore systematically [a] poor prox[y] for overall
4
efficiency in the presence of new and innovative integration"ll because it
condemns a first mover that achieves substantial efficiencies by integrating
products consumers still view as distinct. A rule of reason analysis, weighing
efficiencies against any restraint in the browser market, was thus necessary to
avoid deterring innovation by first movers that decided to combine functional-

1" Id.
hoD.C.

Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 84.

" Id. at 64-67.
12 Id.

at 84.

"3 Id. at 87-88.
114Id.

at 89.
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ities." 5 That analysis was likely to show that tying a browser to the operating
system was efficient because OS vendors without market power frequently
"incorporate basic internet plumbing and other useful functionality into their
OSs."" 6 Thus, integrating the functionality of formerly complementary applications into a dominant platform may well be efficient.
The D.C. Circuit's standard of monopolization under Section 2 also considered the special efficiencies of integration in the platform context, but the tone
of the discussion was decidedly less deferential to the platform owner's design choices. First, the court of appeals considered whether a practice was
anticompetitive, hurting rivals without obviously benefiting consumers; if the
practice was prima facie anticompetitive, the defendant could offer an efficiency justification. Applying this standard, the court held that Microsoft did
7
not violate Section 2 "simply by developing an attractive product,"" even if it
was "incompatible with those of its rivals.""'
But the court did condemn design measures that hurt the platform prospects
of Netscape's browser without providing benefits to consumers." 9 The court
observed:
As a general rule, courts are properly very skeptical about claims that competition has been harmed by a dominant firm's product design changes. . . .
In a competitive market, firms routinely innovate in the hope of appealing to
consumers, sometimes in the process making their products incompatible
with those of rivals; the imposition of liability when a monopolist does the
same thing will inevitably deter a certain amount of innovation. This is all
the more true in a market, such as this one, in which the product itself is
rapidly changing. . . . Judicial deference to product innovation, however,

does not mean that a monopolist's product design decisions are per se
lawful.120

The court held that three of Microsoft's design changes reduced competition

by hindering the platform threat posed by Netscape's browser, and that two of
these changes lacked an efficiency justification. Excluding Internet Explorer
from the Add/Remove Programs utility made it harder for OEMs to delete the

15Id. at 92.
116Id. at 93. The government understandably declined to pursue this claim on remand because
it would have been required to prove that the tie reduced competition in the market for browsers,
which the court had already held did not exist.
17Id. at 68 (considering Microsoft's development of a free Internet Explorer Access Kit for
Internet Access Providers).
"1 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 74-75 (considering Microsoft's Windows-specific version
of Sun's Java Virtual Machine).
" Id. at 64-65 (considering "excluding IE from the 'Add/Remove Programs' utility; designing
Windows so as in certain circumstances to override the user's choice of a default browser other
than IE; and commingling code related to browsing and other code in the same files, so that any
attempt to delete the files containing IE would, at the same time, cripple the operating system").
120 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 65.

ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL

386

[Vol. 78

visible means of access to IE. Similarly, commingling "code specific to Web
browsing in the same files as code that provided operating system functions"
deterred OEMs from deleting browser code because doing so "would also
delete vital operating system routines and thus cripple Windows." 2 ' Both of
these design choices made it less attractive for OEMs to pre-install Netscape's
browser alone' 22 and thus increased Microsoft browser usage share "through
something other than competition on the merits." 23
Microsoft failed to substantiate its claim that the efficiency benefits of integration justified these choices.1 24 Designing Windows to launch Internet Explorer for certain tasks and in certain contexts regardless of the user's choice
of a default browser was also anticompetitive because it "prevent[ed] some
people from using other browsers," 25 but Microsoft justified the overrides by
pointing out that Netscape's browser could not perform the relevant tasks at
all or as well.126 Although seemingly tangential, the court's holding on the
default override all but foreclosed any future remedy that required the removal of browsing code because all of the code was necessary for IE to function in the instances in which the override was justified.
In Intel, the FTC alleged that Intel reduced competition in both the CPU
and GPU markets as they are presently structured.'27 But it also alleged a
scenario, similar to the central narrative in Microsoft, in which Intel reduced
future competition on both price and innovation between its CPUs and its
rivals' GPUs or GP-GPUs.128 In this scenario, as in Microsoft, the actions of
rivals threatened to commoditize the defendant's platform product by innova-

122

Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 65.

123

Id.

121

Id. at 66-67.
at 65. At the time, Windows would launch IE to access Windows Help and Windows
Update sites and whenever the user accessed the Internet through "My Computer" or "Windows
Explorer."
126Id. at 67. The Netscape browser did not support the Active X controls on which Windows
Help and Windows Update depend, and did not allow users to access the Internet within the My
Computer or Windows Explorer windows.
127The FTC also alleged that "Intel redesigned its compiler and library software in or about
2003" in ways that had "no legitimate technical benefit," and whose only purpose was "to reduce
the [apparent] performance of competing CPUs relative to Intel's CPUs." It did this by designing
the compilers to translate applications programs into object code that ran slower on AMD's
CPU's than on Intel's-thus creating the impression that AMD's processors were slower. Intel
Complaint, supra note 2, 8. The FTC also alleges that Intel bundled its CPU with its chipset
with integrated graphics, but this action is challenged only on the basis of pricing. Id. T 24.
128 Id. 1 27. ("The loss of price and innovation competition in the relevant markets will continue to have an adverse effect on competition and hence consumers. Absent the remedy provided herein, Intel will continue to maintain or even enhance its market power, consumers will
have fewer choices, prices will be higher than they would be in competitive markets, and quality
and innovation will be diminished.").
124

125Id.
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tions that could shift the key functionality of the platform to a complement,
and the defendant responded by trying to slow the development and adoption
of rival technologies.1 29
After having cooperated with GPU producers like Nvidia and having encouraged them to develop interoperable products using the interfaces that Intel
supported,130 Intel allegedly limited interoperability when their innovative efforts threatened its dominance. For example, it "reversed its previous course
of allowing Nvidia's integrated GPU chipsets to interoperate with Intel CPUs,
thereby foreclosing Nvidia's integrated GPU chipsets from connecting to Intel's future CPU platforms."'3 ' It allegedly took similar steps to impede interoperability for discrete GPUsl 32 as a way of limiting GP-GPU computing
functionality. Intel allegedly did all this to thwart the prospect that the GPU
would "emerge as a potential challenge to Intel's monopoly over CPUs."l33
Because of Intel's history of dealing with complementors, the FTC asserted
(implicitly invoking Aspen Skiing)13 4 that Intel had a duty to assure that complementors' products would "interoperate freely, fully, and in a nondiscriminatory manner with its CPUs, chipsets, and related connections."'
According to the FTC, the GPU producers are thus nascent platform rivals
of Intel in CPU and GPU markets at least as clearly as Netscape or Java were
nascent rivals of Microsoft in an undefined platform market that included both
operating systems and middleware.' 3 6 Moreover, the FTC alleged that Intel
illegally denied interoperability to its nascent rivals just as the DOJ alleged
Microsoft had denied interoperation to Java by developing an incompatible
129 Id.
19 ("These measures are intended to slow down developments in the relevant markets
until Intel can catch up, and have had the effect of foreclosing competitive GPU products and
slowing the development and widespread adoption of GP GPU computing.").
o30
"Intel encouraged Nvidia to innovate on the Intel platform. Intel and Nvidia worked together for a number of years to ensure that Nvidia's GPUs could interoperate with Intel's CPU."
Id. 82. "Intel licensed Nvidia to allow it to manufacture GPUs integrated on chipsets to be used
with Intel's CPUs." Id. 83. "Intel engaged in deception by misleading Nvidia on Intel's CPU
roadmaps, thereby greatly increasing its competitor's costs and further delaying the development
of other products that would have accelerated the adoption of GP GPU computing." Id. 85.
131 Id.
84.
132 "For discrete GPUs, Intel has created several interoperability problems, including reductions of speed and encryption, that have had the effect of degrading the industry standard interconnection with Intel's CPUs." Id. 86.
133Id. 23.
134Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 603 (1985) (the right to
refuse to deal was qualified where "the monopolist did not merely reject a novel offer to participate in a cooperative venture that had been proposed by a competitor [but] elected to make an
important change in a pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had
persisted for several years").
135Id.
136 PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 1, at 105-06 (middleware and operating systems were only
competitors in an undefined "market in which platform producers compete for the attention of
developers by adding APIs").
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Java Virtual Machine. But, as the Microsoft court eventually determined, denials of interoperability are monopolistic only if they actually reduce competition and lack efficiency justifications."' The increasing integration of CPUs
and GPUs could provide such a justification if the most efficient design requires limiting interoperation with discrete GPUs. Not only Intel but AMD,
which lacks monopoly power, is pursuing the path of integration. As a result,
Nvidia has reportedly been forced to limit its development program for integrated GPUs.13 s For reasons we described in the last section, the FTC's predictions that the GPU will evolve to displace more capable CPUs are
questionable. To the extent the FTC exaggerated the interchangeability of
functions between the CPU and GPU, its account of Intel's motive for hindering interoperability between the CPU and GPU and its prediction of their
likely effects become correspondingly less plausible.

C.

REMEDIES

Much of the significance of a finding of liability (or a settlement) turns on
the specifics of the ensuing remedy. In both Microsoft and Intel, the special
role of platforms in innovation was a pervasive concern in shaping relief. For
example, the court of appeals in Microsoft reversed the district court's initial
order that would have broken Microsoft up, because it failed to address
Microsoft's contention that such an order would "lower[ ] rates of innovation
and disrupt[ ] the evolution of Windows as a software development platform."' 39 The district court's later decision approving the terms of the settlement in the case (and imposing the same terms in a separate case pursued by
nonsettling state plaintiffs) was also cautious about intruding on Microsoft's
design choices. It recognized that remedies should stop proven anticompetitive conduct, but scrutinized any claim that relief should go further by changing industry structure, mandating disclosures of trade secrets, or regulating
product design and commercial relationships. The FTC in Intel was similarly
at some pains to explain how the relief in its consent order promoted innovation by Intel's rivals without inhibiting legitimate innovation by Intel itself.

'n See supra Part I.B.1. In order to violate the antitrust laws, the incompatible product must
have an anticompetitive effect that outweighs any procompetitive justification for the design.
D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 75 (reversing a finding of liability for developing a Windowsspecific Java Virtual Machine because the new product "allow[ed] applications to run more
swiftly and [did] not itself have any anticompetitive effect").
138Jon Stokes, Day of Chipset Reckoning Arrives for Nvidia, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://arstechnica.com/hardware/news/2009/10/day-of-nvidia-chipset-reckoning-arrives.ars; see
also Jon Stokes, Latest GPU Market Numbers Spell Bad News for Nvidia, ARs TECHNICA (May
3, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2011/05/latest-gpu-market-numbers-spell-badnews-for-nvidia.ars.
1 D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 102.
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We will focus on the two remedies' treatment of product design and interoperability. The court of appeals in Microsoft held two types of product design anticompetitive and unjustified: the failure to provide a means of deleting
the visible means of accessing the browser, and the commingling of browser
and operating system code. Both were found anticompetitive for the same
reason-they deterred OEMs and end-users from removing IE and thus deterred them from installing Netscape's browser in its place. At the remedial
stage, however, the approved relief 40 included no remedy specifically aimed
at commingling code; it required instead that Microsoft assure that OEMs and
end-users could make unbiased choices of rival middleware.141 For example, it
required Microsoft to provide ways to delete the means of access to the defined middleware, by icons, menu items, and so forth.142 Microsoft complied
with this provision by creating (and modifying in response to the plaintiffs
concerns) a utility that would allow OEMs and end-users to set which programs would be accessible and which would be the default program for that
function.143 Implementation of the "competing middleware and defaults" provisions involved detailed supervision of the design of portions of several versions of Windows, but Microsoft was able to comply with the plaintiffs'
requirements without major delays.
The courts rejected arguments by the nonsettling states that the remedy
should require Microsoft to allow removal of the actual code that provides the
middleware's functionality. Such a remedy, they reasoned, would come at
great cost and provide no greater benefit than the decree's requirement that
Microsoft allow removal of visible means of access to the functionality. One
of the primary costs of such a remedy would be that developers could no
longer assume that the standard Windows API was intact. The district court,
for example, found that "Microsoft's innovation would be stifled by the re-

'4 Second Modified Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232, 2009 WL
1348218 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Microsoft Judgment]. This modified version of the
consent decree supersedes earlier versions entered November 12, 2002 and September 7, 2006.
All of our remaining citations will be to this most recent version. There were actually two Final
Judgments in Microsoft because the so-called nonsettling or "California Group" of states declined to participate in the settlement of the federal case, but the differences between the two
judgments are minor and do not affect our analysis here. For much more discussion of remedies
in the case, see William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Measuring Compliance with Compulsory
Licensing Remedies in the American Microsoft Case, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (2009) [hereinafter
Measuring Compliance]; William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an
Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol
Licensing Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 77 (2007) [hereinafter Software
Development].
141 Microsoft Judgment, supra note 140, §§ III.C & III.H.
142 Id. § III.H. I. The mechanisms must provide separate and unbiased choices in these actions.
143 Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 9-12, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 19, 2005), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212100/212195.htm.
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quirement that it redesign its products, [and] the ability of ISVs to innovate
would be slowed because of the detrimental effects of the presence in the
marketplace of multiple versions of Microsoft's Windows operating system,
each with different code and different APIs."'" The court of appeals added
that the decree's approach was sufficient in "reducing the costs an OEM
might face in having to support multiple internet browsers," thus hindering
"Microsoft's efforts to reduce software developers' interest in writing to the
[APIs] exposed by any operating system other than Windows," all "without
intruding itself into the design and engineering of the Windows operating system." 45 The court of appeals also agreed that there was value in not fragmenting the Windows API and thus reducing innovation by Microsoft's ISVs:
"addressing the applications barrier to entry in a manner likely to harm consumers is not self-evidently an appropriate way to remedy an antitrust
violation."l 46
The court of appeals also agreed with the district court that no specific
remedy was necessary for the "Java deception" episode. The court had rejected the district court's holding that Microsoft monopolized by developing a
Windows-specific JVM, because that product was faster than Sun's crossplatform version. But the court upheld the holding that Microsoft monopolized by representing to developers that its JVM was cross-platform (i.e., not
Windows-specific). In other words, the design itself was lawful but
Microsoft's deceptive marketing of the design was not. In the remedies proceedings, the court of appeals rejected the suggestion that the Java deception
justified an order requiring Microsoft to continue to support any industry standard that it claimed to support or that it had altered by making proprietary
extensions. ' It was not enough to point to expert testimony that "Microsoft's
proprietary control over 'important interfaces' would make it 'harder' for rival
operating systems to compete with Windows," because full compliance with
industry standards was subjective, difficult, and in some instances

impossible.148
Thus, the court refused to order costly and unnecessary product design
changes and interoperability measures as relief for some of the conduct that it
had found unlawful. On the other hand, the consent decree imposed remedies
for some conduct that was never found illegal. During the negotiations over
the remedy, the government raised the long-standing (but never substantiated)
concerns that Microsoft manipulated its APIs to hinder interoperability with

144D.D.C.

States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 158.

14D.C. Circuit 2004, 373 F.3d at 1210.
146Id. at 1211.
47

1

Id. at 1215.

148Id.
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149
certain third-party applications in order to favor its own applications.
0
Microsoft agreed to a remedy that required it to document its APIss as well
as "native" communication protocols that its server operating systems use to
interoperate with Windows clients.'"' The district court approved the provisions enthusiastically, identifying the protocol-licensing provision as "the
most forward-looking" relief in the decree because it would facilitate innovation in network computing.15 2 The court of appeals agreed, with some
reservations.15

Its reservations were justified. The API provision caused few major
problems, but the protocol-licensing requirement proved to be so costly and
difficult to satisfy that the district court felt compelled to extend the term of
the final judgment until May 12, 2011.154 Microsoft was able to satisfy the
government that it had complied with this portion of the final judgments after
almost a decade of effort, including testing under the supervision of a Technical Committee of experts."' Even with the enormous efforts to document and
make available the covered protocols, the provision had little, if any, measurable effect on competition.' 56 Given these meager benefits, we can see in retrospect that this provision was the most misguided and costly aspect of the
government case.
The consent order in Intel also addresses issues of product design and interoperability. Unlike Microsoft, the FTC in Intel alleged a number of actual
denials of interoperation with rivals in CPU, GPU, and GP-GPU computing,
which we summarized in the last section."' The proposed 6rder addresses
these concerns in two primary ways: mandating that Intel support a standard
interface to promote interoperability' 5 and prohibiting "predatory design" or

1

Page & Childers, Software Development, supra note 139, at 93-102.
§ III.D.

150Microsoft Judgment, supra note 140,

151Id. § I.E.
152D.D.C. States Remedy 2002, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 173.

153
D.C.

Circuit 2004, 373 F.3d at 1222-25.

154New York v. Microsoft Corp., 531 F. Supp. 2d 141, 144 (D.D.C. 2008) (D.D.C. Extension

2008).
155Joint Status Report on Microsoft's Compliance with the Final Judgments at 4, United States
v. Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 22, 2011), available at http://
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f270200/270210.pdf ("Plaintiffs' overall assessment is that the documents are of sufficient completeness and quality such that the Communications Protocols, as
defined in the Final Judgments, are 'available for use by third parties' within the meaning of
Section III.E."). Microsoft indicated that it would continue these interoperability efforts after the
decrees expired. Id. at 9.
156Page & Childers, Measuring Compliance, supra note 139, at 266-69.
157See supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
58Intel Order, supra note 2, § II.
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"predatory innovation" 5 9 that hinders interoperability.16 0 The required interface is some version of the PCI Express bus. GPUs communicate with the
CPU using the PCI Express bus under the PCIe standard. In desktop computers, a discrete GPU board typically plugs into a PCIe expansion slot; integrated GPUs also communicate with the CPU using a PCIe interface, but one
that is a component of the motherboard.
The order requires Intel to maintain the PCIe interface for up to six years
and not to take any actions that would degrade its functionality as an interface.16 ' Relatedly, Intel must, annually through 2015, provide Nvidia with
roadmaps disclosing how its processor platforms will implement the PCIe interface.162 By keeping the PCIe bus available as long as it remains an industry
standard, and agreeing not to alter it to limit interoperability, Intel assures its
complementors that "they will be able to connect to Intel CPUs in both mainstream and high-performance computers in the future" and "that their products
will remain viable and thus maintain their incentives to innovate-including
the continued development of alternative computing architectures such as
General Purpose GPU computing." 3 The provision is designed to allow
standalone GPU makers, particularly Nvidia, to compete for inclusion in Intel
systems that have integrated Intel GPUs. The FTC evidently was concerned
that Intel would abandon PCI Express in favor of other interfaces that would
disadvantage Nvidia.
The order also prohibits Intel from engaging in "predatory design"-making any design'change (other than an inadvertent bug) that "degrades the performance" of rival products without "provid[ing] an actual benefit" to Intel's
product.1'" The FTC explains that this provision bars design measures that
"solely disadvantage competitive or complementary products" by, for exam-

159 Analysis

of Consent Order, supra note 9, at 13.

i6o Intel Order, supra note 2, § V.
161Id. § II.C. On November 2, 2010, the FTC modified its order to allow Intel to sell until 2013
a chip code-named Oak Trail that had been in development before the effective date of the
decree, even though it does "not include the Required Interface in [the] Mainstream
Microprocessor Platform." See id. § II.E.
162Id. § VI.B. The required roadmap is defined as one "that identifies the internal development
name of future Mainstream Microprocessors under development by Respondent and, for each,
the calendar quarter within which such product is then-planned to be commercially introduced
and the then-planned version of the Standard PCI Express Bus interface." Id. § I.DD.
163Analysis of Consent Order, supra note 9, at 7.
164Intel Order, supra note 2, § V.A. This standard resembles the "sham test" described in
Richard Gilbert, Holding Innovation to an Antitrust Standard,COMPETTON Po'Y INT'., Spring
2007, at 47, 61-62. Gilbert argues that antitrust should give "if not a safe harbor, at least a wide
berth for innovation by a single firm, because innovation nearly always increases economic welfare and the adverse effects of innovation that excludes rivals are typically no greater than the
effects of a unilateral refusal to deal."
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pie, "cutting off competitors' access to its CPUs and slowing down various
connections to the CPU." 65
Despite the FTC's characterization of the conduct as "predatory," the harm
from the design change need not be intentional. Moreover, Intel bears the
burden of proving a "real" benefit in order to avoid liability. On the other
hand, the provision does not "require a balancing test that would weigh the
anticompetitive harms against the benefits of a particular Intel design change;
it is sufficient that there be actual benefits." 66 Interestingly, the FTC suggests
that a "balancing test would be appropriate in a legal challenge to an Intel
design change under Section 5 of the FTC Act or Section 2 of the Sherman
Act," but that would require a separate lawsuit.'67
Neither of these proposed requirements violates the lessons of the Microsoft
experience. At first glance, the mandate to support the PCIe standard bus
seems to contradict the finding in Microsoft that a mandate to support industry
standards was likely to be difficult and counterproductive. But the court in
Microsoft was addressing a proposal that Microsoft maintain compliance with
an open-ended class of standards that "var[ied] widely in complexity and
specificity" and for which there were incompatible implementations. The
PCIe mandate is far narrower. The PCIe mandate also might raise concerns
that complying with the standard will involve the parties in a costly and futile
compliance program like the one implementing the Microsoft protocol-licensing provision. But the protocol-licensing provision required Microsoft to identify and document scores of protocols that Microsoft had never documented
even internally and to provide extensive technical support to developers that
might want to use the protocols. The requirement that Intel support the PCIe
standard, by contrast, is focused on a standard interface that Intel has supported for years. Continuing that support should be straightforward and easily
supervised.
By its terms, the order allows Intel to "determine the version or specification of the Standard PCI Express Bus interface (e.g., PCIe Base Specification
2.1, PCIe Base Specification 3.0) that will be included in each of its Main-

65

Analysis of Consent Order, supra note 9, at 13.

166Id.
167 Id. The court of appeals in Microsoft also held that "if the monopolist's procompetitive
justification stands unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm
of the conduct outweighs the procompetitive benefit." D.C. Circuit 2001, 253 F.3d at 59. The
court never reached this stage of the test, however. In the court's analysis, product design
changes that brought obvious benefits were not anticompetitive at all. But cf Jean Tirole, The
Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer,COMPETITION PoL'Y INT'L, Spring 2005, at 1, 20-21 (arguing that "predation does not always imply a cost for the predator; yet, the efficiency gains may be
more than offset by the increase in future monopoly power from a social perspective").
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stream Microprocessor Platforms subject to this provision." 68 The cost of supporting the PCIe standard is likely to decrease year-by-year due to the normal
price behavior of aging technologies. Moreover, it will not prevent Intel from
introducing a newer, improved standard, because both standards can be simultaneously supported. For example, for a number of years, Intel-compatible
motherboards featured both AGP (a prior bus standard) as well as PCIe board
slots.
Via objected that the order should
require full and open interoperability. It should require that Intel publish
enough information for other companies to be instruction-set, bus, and pin
compatible with Intel's CPUs. Intel should be prohibited from asserting intellectual property rights over this information when used to connect peripherals to an Intel CPU and should be required to offer FRAND [fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory] terms to connect competing CPUs to
peripherals designed for Intel CPUs (with a royalty based only on the actual
69
incremental benefit of any new protocol relative to other existing options).'
Such an order would have been closer to the communications protocol program, and would have raised similar problems of compliance. The FTC responded after the close of the comment period:
Your suggestions entail Intel disclosing significant design information about
its CPUs and bus protocols and forgoing enforcement of any patents that are
connected to implementation of those technologies; essentially, your proposal would allow Intel's competitors to copy of [sic] Intel products without
would strip Intel and its comfairly compensating Intel. Such a requirement
petitors of incentives to innovate.170
This response reflects appropriate awareness of the costs of excessive disclosure and interoperability measures in antitrust cases.
The predatory innovation provision is also less problematic than its name
might otherwise suggest. It does not broadly protect rivals from innovation by
a dominant firm. Instead, it imposes a duty similar to the D.C. Circuit's monopolization standard in Microsoft: a design measure may be unlawfully exclusionary if it harms a nascent rival without providing consumer benefits. In
some of Microsoft's innovations, like the Windows-specific JVM, the benefits
were sufficiently obvious from test results that no further inquiry was necessary; if they were less obvious, then Microsoft was required to offer an effi168 Intel Order, supra note 2, § II.B. Via objected that this provision "allows Intel to implement
an already obsolete version of PCI Express, maintaining its proprietary DMI Protocol as the
'must have' connection." Comment of Via Technologies, Inc. at 7, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No.
9341 (Aug. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Via Comment], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
intelcorp/550006-00012-55265.pdf.
169 Via Comment, supra note 167, at 8.
70 Letter to Via Technologies, Inc., at III, Intel Corp., FTC Docket No. 9341 (Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101102intelletterchen.pdf.
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ciency justification, as it was able to do in the case of the default overrides. It
seems unlikely that Intel, whose business model depends on coordination of
its platform design with complementors, will have difficulty showing the benefits of its design choices.
One measure of the costs of implementing an antitrust remedy in high technology is the role of technical consultants. In Microsoft, the consent decree
authorized the creation, at Microsoft's expense, of a Technical Committee
(TC) of software design experts to track Microsoft's compliance with the decree on behalf of the plaintiffs."' The nonsettling states hired a technical consultant, also at Microsoft's expense, who worked essentially as part of the
TC.172 The TC and its staff of engineers worked for over seven years on many
tasks, especially testing Microsoft's documentation of its protocols. The cost
of operating the TC, including salaries, travel, equipment, among other things,
is not publicly known, but it must run to many millions of dollars; Microsoft's
internal costs of compliance must be a multiple of that. In contrast, the Intel
consent decree authorizes the FTC to appoint technical consultants at Intel's
expense only if reasonably necessary and with an overall cap of $2 million in
payments to the consultants. 73 This nominal cap suggests that the parties do
not anticipate and will not incur the sort of expenses that the TC and
Microsoft likely faced in the implementation of the protocol licensing provision of its consent decree.
IV. CONCLUSION
The FTC's disposition of Intel suggests that the antitrust community has
learned the lessons of the Microsoft case. Platform markets and the platform
owners have central roles in innovation in our must innovative markets, yet
they are also in a position to skew innovation in ways that may be inconsistent
with consumer welfare. We have considered how these characteristics should
influence the interpretation of antitrust standards, and then compared how the
courts in Microsoft and the FTC in Intel actually implemented antitrust standards on the issues of market definition, liability, and remedies. Where
Microsoft properly recognized the competing considerations, the FTC followed its lead. Equally important, the FTC recognized those measures in the
Microsoft final judgments that subsequent experience showed were unduly
costly, and agreed to terms that avoided similar pitfalls.

171Microsoft Judgment, supra note 140, §§ IV.B.2 & IV.B.8.
172

D.D.C. Extension 2008, 531 F. Supp. 2d at 157 n.25.

173Intel Order, supra note 2, § IX A. & B.

